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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY
OF AMERICA, a Corporation,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
VS.

PAUL J. HENICH, d/b/a P. G. & H.
GENERAL CONTRACTORS, ELLEN
JANE HENICH, his wife,

Defendants!

No.
9596

MAX S. ANDREWS and NED E.
SHURTLEFF, individually and as a copartnership d/b/a SHURTLEFF & ANDREWS CONSTRUCTION C 0 MPANY, and SHURTLEFF & ANDREWS, INC., a Utah Corporation,

Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
Appeal from the Judgment of the
3rd Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County
Hon. Ray Van Cott, Jr., Judge

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action upon an Indemnity Agreement, wherein
the indemnitee insurance company seeks to recover for losses
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suffered in paying obligations on a contractor's bond. The
defendants defended generally on the ground that the Indemnity Agreement did not cover the bond upon which the
indemnitee suffered its losses.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the court, the Honorable Ray Van
Cott, Jr., presiding. From Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $164,678.09,
plus costs, defendants Max Andrews, Ned Shurtleff and
Shurtleff & Andrews, Inc., appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appealing defendants seek reversal of the Judgment,
and a Judgment in their favor of no cause of action, or a new
trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Paul J. Henich was a contractor who constructed two
different projects upon which the plaintiff furnished Payment
and Performance Bonds. The first project was the St. Joseph
Convent Faculty Residence at Ogden, Utah, under contract,
dated December 23, 1959, and the other project was the Pacific
Intermountain Express Terminal Building in Salt Lake City,
Utah, under contract dated January 25, 1960. (Ex. 17).
The St. Joseph contract was awarded on or about December
23, 1959, and in connection therewith, Payment and Performance Bonds (Ex. 13) were executed and furnished by the
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plaintiff. The P. I. E. contract was dated January 25, 1960,
and finally executed about February 1, 1960. (R. 272). The
amount of the P. I. E. contract and bonds thereon was
$271,030.00. (Exs. 17, 4).
The defendants and appellants, Ned Shurtleff and Max
Andrews were organized as a partnership known as Shurtleff
& Andrews Construction Company, and were also organized
and doing business as a corporation known as Shurtleff &
Andrews, Inc. Both organizations were engaged in the rental
of heavy equipment, and defendants had known the defendant
Paul J. Henich upon a business basis prior to December 23,
1959. (R. 228).
An Indemnity Agreement (Ex. 2) was dated December
23, 1959, and notarized by Doris H. Farley, an employee of
the plaintiff, which notarization appears on the document as
December 23, 1959. The document also bears a corporate
acknowledgment on December 23, 1959. ~ Corporate Resolution, (Ex. 3) dated December 23, 1959, showing a Special
Directors meeting on December 23, 1959, accompanied Exhibit
2. It is upon this Indemnity Agreement that the plaintiff sued
the defendants and appellants for recovery of the losses
incurred in connection with the P. I. E. job because of the
failure of the principal Paul J. Henich to pay the outstanding
bills thereon. (R. 1-10) (Exs. 2, 3).
The plaintiff contended, and the court found, that the
said Indemnity Agreement and Corporate Resolution was not
executed or notarized, nor was the corporate acknowledgment
affixed thereto on December 23, 1959, but rather sometime
during the week of January 2 5 through January 30, 1960.
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(R. 75-87). Appellants contend that the Indemnity Agreement
was executed on December 23, 1959, and only applied to the
St. Joseph bond.
Paul J. Henich failed to pay the outstanding bills on the
St. Joseph job, and the appellants paid for these bills only
under their liability on the Indemnity Agreement for the St.
Joseph bond, the total amount of $52,625.79. (R. 240).
The plaintiff admittedly falsified the dates and individual
and corporate acknowledgments on said Indemnity Agreement. (Ex. 2). (R. 289-291). The plaintiff obtained financial
statements and other information during the week of January
25 through January 30 in reliance upon which the bond on
the P. I. E. job was issued. (R. 202-204).
The plaintiff's employees, Dale Barton and Doris H.
Farley, testified, and the Court found, that the Indemnity
Agreement and the bonds issued on the P. I. E. job were executed sometime during the week of January 2 5 through
February 1, 1960. The testimony did not show the sequence
under which the bonds were issued, the financial information
was obtained, the P. I. E. contract was furnished, and the
Indemnity Agreement signed and issued. (R. 202-211, 290).
The defendants and appellants were never informed that
the plaintiff had received, and accepted, or had relied upon
the said Indemnity Agreement. The first notice that the defendants and appellants received of the plaintiff's claim that said
Indemnity Agreement was in effect as to the P. I. E. job, was
after the P. I. E. job was completed and the losses sustained.
On December 23, 19'59, when the Indemnity Agreement was
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dated and executed under the contention of appellants, the
P. I. E. contract had not been consummated and the contract
amount thereof had not been fixed. ( R. 178). The P. I. E.
contract was not received from San Francisco in its completed
form as to amount and final terms until January 28, 1960.
(Ex. 18).
The plaintiff was required to pay under its bond on the
P. I. E. job, the total sum of $164,678.09. (R. 84).

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE
ACTION AT THE CLOSE OF PLAINTIFF'S CASE.
At the close of plaintiff's case, defendants and appellants
moved for dismissal upon various grounds. (R. 164-166).
Appellants contend that at this point, the plaintiff had not
proven a prima facie case upon competent evidence. Appellants
contend that the failure of the Court to grant this Motion to
Dismiss \vas error, and submit in support thereof, the following argument:
Over appellants' objection (R. 110) the plaintiff and respondent offered Exhibit 2 dated and notarized on December
23, 1959. This was offered without any evidence to indicate
the execution and dating thereof upon any date other than
December 23, 1959. (R. 108-110).
The Exhibit has typed on it wording which limits its
application to the Convent job and to the P. I. E. job. It
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further states thereon the contract amounts of each of the
two contracts. As to the P. I. E. job, the contract amount was
$271,030.00. Very obviously, the information relating to the
P. I. E. contract \vas not available and was not even in existence
on December 23, 1959. As a matter of fact, it was not actually
typed onto the document until the latter part of January, 1960.
(R. 145).
Therefore, the plaintiff in its short and very limited case
in chief, sued upon an agreement (Ex. 2) which it immediately
impeached, contradicted, varied and altered without competent
evidence to explain the basis for these variations. By its own
chief witness, Mr. Schalow, the competency of the alleged
agreement was destroyed, and the document became inadmissible. On cross-examination, Mr. Schalow testified that the
agreement had been filled in in Dale Burton's office sometime
between January 25, 1960, and January 30, 1960. (R. 145).
Therefore, the general validity of the alleged agreement, as
well as any prima facie value it may have had was eliminated.
It is fundamental that a party offering a document as its
own exhibit as a Ctpart of its case in chief cannot thereafter
impeach or contradict the tern1s thereof." In the case of
Davenport v. Stratton, 149 P. 2d 4, the Court said about an
exhibit which was offered by the defendant:
C(This Exhibit having been introduced in evidence
by the defendant, he is bound by its provisions.''
The general rule is again enunciated in Peters v. Taylor, 251
Pac. 446, 450 (Ariz.), to-wit:
((The general rule unquestionably is that one who
introduces documentary evidence to support his con-
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tentions, vouches for its integrity and is conclusively
bound thereby.''
The Court further indicated that only if the instrument is
introduced to show part of a scheme to defraud, may the
instrument be varied or impeached. Also see Goldsworthy v.
Anderson, 21 Pac. 2d 718 (Colo.), where the Court said:
"An essential part of the proof thereof was a copy
of the report which had been prepared by examiners ...
When plaintiff produced this report, he thereby
vouched for its accuracy so far as the issues herein
involved are concerned, and the Court in admitting the
same, received it without any limitation or restriction."
Please see 20 Am. fur. 915; 17 Annotated Cases 381, 1; 32
C.J.S. Para. 1040 (d), Page 1113.
It is, of course, possible under some cases for the Notary
Public to contradict the substance of the certificate which he
or she has previous! y executed. However, the cases are clear
that the evidence under which the Notary Public's certificate
can be varied must be clear, convincing and without reasonable
doubt. See Northcrest v. Walker Bank & Trust Company, 248
P. 2d 692 (Utah); Gate·wood t'. Roquemore1 118 P. 2d 1020
(Okla.); and, Pritchett tJ. Brevard Naval Stores Company, 170
Southern 610. However, the cases also reason that the party
for whose benefit the notarization has been executed cannot
cause the certification to be in1peached. See Gatewood v.
Roquemore, supra.
As the evidence shows here, the Notary Public was an
employee of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff is the party who
caused the notarization to be executed. Therefore, the plaintiff,
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in this case, stands in the same position as does the grantor
in the Gatewood case and other similar cases cited therein,
and it cannot introduce evidence impeaching the notarization.
Therefore, without competent evidence in the form of the
agreement, the plaintiff has no case.
There are further inconsistencies which preclude the
Court from making a clear finding to the effect that the
plaintiff can recover on the Indemnity Agreement.
The Complaint (R. 2) states that the bond for the Convent
job was executed on or about December 23, 1959, in reliance
upon the execution of the Indemnity Agreement. (Ex. 2).
Contrary to this judicial admission, the plaintiff thereafter,
in trying the law suit, attempted to prove not that the Indemnity
Agreement was executed on or prior to December 23, 1959,
but that it was executed in January of 1960, and backdated to
December 23, 1959.
The Complaint states that the Convent job bond was
executed in reliance upon the Indemnity Agreement, whereas
Mr. Schalow, the plaintiff's chief witness, testified that the
Convent bond was not executed in reliance upon the Indemnity
Agreement, but was executed sometime in February of 1960.
( R. 48, 15 7) . Mr. Schalow further testified that the Indemnity
Agreement was not signed on the date that it bears, but he
did not know upon which date it was executed. (R. 112,
120, 146, 154). He testified, however, that the Convent bond
and the P. I. E. bond were both executed at about the same
date. (R. 157, 163).
Therefore, Mr. Schalow's testimony-and his was the
only testimony in support of the plaintiff's case-is inconsistent
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with and contradictory to the allegations of the Complaint.
He did not know when the Indemnity Agreement was executed,
but thought it was executed sometime prior to the execution
of the P. I. E. bond. He stated that the Convent job bond
and the P. I. E. bond were executed about the same time. The
Complaint states that the Convent bond was executed on or
about December 23, 1959, and we could, therefore, assume
under Mr. Schalow's testimony that the P. I. E. bond was
likewise executed at about that time. All of this confused
testimony, however, merely confirms the fact that the attempts
to vary the date and the notarizaion of the Indemnity Agreement are confused and are without substantial support either
from an evidentiary or from a reasonable point of view. It
cannot, therefore, be said that the trial court had before it
any clear and convincing evidence which would warrant the
complete disregard of all of the dates and notarizations on
the agreement in favor of a nebulous date of execution nsomewhere between January 25, 1960, and January 30, 1960."
The plaintiff certainly did not sustain the burden of proof
required of it. As is shown hereafter in this brief, the plaintiff
did not improve its position, nor clarify the evidence. It added
nothing by way of competent and convincing evidence. Therefore, the defendants and appellants were entitled to have
their 1v1otion to Dismiss granted.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE
THAT THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENT WAS EXECUTED
BETWEEN JANUARY 25, 1960, AND JANUARY 30,
1960.
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A. THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENT MUST BE IN
WRITING UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
Title 25·5·4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, our Statute of
Frauds, provides that every promise to answer the debt,
default or miscarrage of another," must be in writing, other·
wise said agreement would be void. Indemnity Agreements
are deemed to be contracts to answer for the debt of another.
See Nephi Processing Plant v. Western Cooperative, 242 Fed.
2d 567; 27, Am. fur. Para. 6; and, 49 Am. fur., Par. 146. It is
generally held that if the predominant purpose of the promissor
under an agreement to answer for the debt of another is to
subserve or further his own interest rather than merely to
underwrite the debt of another, it is an original undertaking
and not within the Statute of Frauds. Where, as in this case,
however, the predominant purpose is not to further the indem·
nitor' s interest, then the agreement is within the Statute of
Frauds. As is aptly stated in 2 Williston 2d Ed., Par. 452,
quoting Davis v. Patrick, 141 U. S. 479, 487:
tc

''The purpose of this provision was not to effectuate
but to prevent wrong. It does not apply to promises
in respect to debts created at the instance and for the
benefit of the promissor, but only to those by which
the debt of one party is sought to be charged upon
and collected from another. The reason of the statute
is obvious . . . when a third party is the real debtor
and the party alone receiving benefit, it is impossible
to solve the conflict of memory or testimony in any
manner certain to accomplish justice. There is also a
temptation for a promisee in the case where the real
debtor has proved insolvent or unable to pay, to enlarge the scope of the promise, or to torture mere words
of encouragement and confidence into an absolute
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promise; and it is so obviously just that a promissor
receiving no benefits should be bound only by the
exact terms of this promise, that this statute requiring
a memorandum in writing was enacted. Therefore,
whenever the alleged promissor is an absolute stranger
to the transaction and without interest in it, courts
srictly uphold the obligations of this statute."

Title 25-5-6, Utah Code Annotated, enumerates those
agreements to answer for the debt of another which are original
transactions, and thus not under the Statute of Frauds. Indemnity or Surety Agreements are not specified therein. It thus
seems clear that this Indemnity Agreement (Ex. 2) is one
whereby the indemnitors agree to answer for the debts of the
contractor Henich. It must therefore be in writing.
Our Statute of Frauds also provides that "every agreement
that by its terms is not to be performed within one year from
the making thereof," must be in writing; otherwise it is void.
The Indemnity Agreement sued on herein is to answer for
the debts of Henich which may be paid by the plaintiff surety
company under the bond furnished for the P. I. E. job. ( Exs.
2, ~i). This bond was furnished under ou-r Utah ContractorJ

Bond Statute, Title 14-2-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended. Under this statute, the right of action on the bond
accrues 40 days after the completion or abandonment or
default in the performance of the work provided for in the
contract. The Statute of Limitations within which an action
can be brought on this bond is four years under Title 78-12-25,
Utah Code Annotated. The indemnity obligation, therefore,
runs for at least as long as does the bond liability under the
aforesaid statute, to-wit, four years. Furthermore, if we examine
the P. I. E. construction contract (Ex. 17, Art. 20), we see
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that the contractor must guarantee the work from any defects
for a one-year period after completion of the work. Therefore,
whether by the Statute of Limitations, or by the terms of the
contract, it is apparent that the Indemnity Agreement cannot
be performed within a one-year period. The fact that either
of the parties may put an end to this contract does not take the
agreement out of the Statute of Frauds, 49 Am. fur., Par. 33.
The evidence is uncontroverted that the contract amount
of $271,030.00 for the P. I. E. job was not determined by
either the contractor, Henich, or the plaintiff through its
representative, Dale Barton, until sometime after January 28,
1960. Dale Barton did not learn of the contract amount, and
did not learn that the P. I. E. contract had actually been
executed and that a bond was required until the day upon
which Henich brought the P. I. E. contract to Dale Barton's
office. (R. 178, 179). Neither of the appellants, Andrews and
Shurtleff, knew anything about the P. I. E. job until July,
1960. (R. 230, 256).
Furthermore, it is obvious that on December 23, 1959,
the P. I. E. job had not been consummated to the point where
it could have been included under the Indemnity Agreement
or the corporate resolution. (Exs. 2, 3 and 20).
Of necessity, therefore, the plaintiff, in bringing its suit,
could not rely solely upon the written agreement (Ex.

2)

without admitting the alteration thereof resulting from the
addition to said agreement of the P. I. E. job. Plaintiff could
only attempt to establish a new date of execution of the agreement by parol evidence. This parol evidence manifestly violates
the Statute of Frauds.
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The plaintiff must assert, therefore, substantial oral modifications of the Indemnity Agreement, as follows:
(a) The date of the Agreen1ent is changed to an indefinite period sometime between January 25 and January
30, 1960.
(b) By oral agreement, the indemnity contract is not
to be effective on or about January 25, 1960, the date
of its execution, but is to be retroactive in its effect
and in its liability to December 23, 1959.
(c) By parol evidence, the corporate resolution (Ex.
3) was to be redated as of an indefinite date between
January 2 5 and January 30, but the special meeting
of the Board of Directors alleged! y held sometime
during this period was to have been held instead
December 23, 1959.
However, it is impossible to determine, under plaintiff's
theory, just when the Special Board Meeting \vas held. There
is absolutely no evidence that it vvas held in January. The
Resolution, even though allegedly signed in January, would
still have to state as it does that the Special Meeting was held
December 23- unless of course we completely ignore the
entire resolution. If the meeting was held December 23 then
there could have been no authorization to sign anything
relating to the P. I. E. job.
This confusion aptly demonstrates the impossibility of
an oral modification in the manner claimed by plaintiff and
found by the Court. Such uncertainty should not be permitted
to replace the certainty of the written document. The plaintiff's
chief witness, Mr. Schalow, stated that one must resort to
other discussions and agreements between the parties, since
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the dates mean nothnig. (R. 15 7). One begins to wonder
what other parol side agreements Shurtleff & Andrews entered
into by affixing their signatures to a printed agreement, which
supposedly was to be complete in and of itself. All of these
modifications are clearly a violation of the Statute of Frauds.
B. THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENT CANNOT BE
ORALLY ALTERED UNDER THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE.
It is fundamental law that when parties enter into a written
agreement, that said agreement cannot be orally modified.
This Honorable Court has so stated in Fox Film Company v.
Ogden Theatre, 17 P. 2d 294, where it stated:
Uin the absence of fraud or mistake, the classical
rule to the effect that parol evidence is not admissible
to contradict, vary, add to, or subtract from the terms
of a valid written instrument is generally applied in
cases of this kind."
This principle is reaffirmed in Starley v. Deseret Foods Corporation, 74 P. 2d 1224. Our Court has further stated in
Bamberger Campany, et al v. Certified Productions, Inc., 88
Utah 194:
"Most of the courts of this country hold as a general
rule that an oral modification of a contract required
by the Statute of Frauds to be in writing, will not be
permitted."
The authorities are
guaranty contract cannot
debts. Anzerican Security
214 P. 1062. Likewise, it

quite uniform in holding that a
orally be extended to cover back
Bank v. Liberty Motor Compan)',
is generally accepted that the rule
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against parol evidence to vary or contradict written agreements
applies in full force to preclude any evidence from varying
the date of a written instrument where the date is a material
part of the contract, or undertaking, so that to vary the date
\vould vary the rights of the parties. Grand Junction Gospel
Tabernacle z·. Arvis, 157 P. 2d 619 (Colo.); 32 C.J.S. 963.
In our case, we are not faced with a mere oral change
tn the date of the contract. Rather, appellants are having
imposed upon them a change in liability, a change in circumstances, a change in the actual holding of a directors' meeting,
and most important, a change involving additional liability
of $271,030.00. The plaintiff seeks to invoke an oral agreement
to relate the effective date of the agreement back to December
23, 1959. By relating this liability back to that date, the
plaintiff requires Shurtleff & Andrews to assume debts not
only on the P. I. E. job, but also on the Convent job, which
under the plaintiff's theory, had not been covered previously.
Therefore, it does not solve this problem by merely citing
the general proposition that under the parol evidence rule,
the date of a contract can be changed. Instead, the specific
circumstances surrounding the change of the date and the
attempts to vary the various terms of the written contract
and the effect thereof must be considered. It is certainly
reasonable to argue that neither our Statute of Frauds nor
our parol evidence rule permit such a substantial as well as
complicated variation to a written contract. The trial court,
therefore, committed prejudicial error in permitting the plaintiff to introduce evidence tending to show that the agreement
was executed January 25, 1960, through January 30, 1960.
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As is pointed out hereafter, it is inconceivable that a definite
contract date, such as December 23, 1959, can be .modified
by parol to now become an indefinite contract date, the
indefiniteness of which is vital to the rights of the parties
involved.

POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
INDEMNITY AGREEMENT COVERED THE P.I.E.
BOND.
The trial Court's findings must be based upon a preponderance of the evidence. The evidence must be competent
evidence, it must be worthy of a reasonable construction, and,
where possible, it must be logical. The evidence upon which
the Court has made its findings in support of plaintiffs case
does not meet the standards so required.
Our Supreme Court has found, and in so doing, sustains
the general principle of la\v, that findings by a trial court are
not ordinarily overruled, but if it is clear from the evidence
that the Court's Findings are wrong, the Supreme Court can
review and reverse the Findings of the trial court. Smoot tJ.
Checketts, 125 P. 412 (Utah).
A. ALTERATION OF THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENT.
Obviously the Indemnity instrument, as well as the corporate resolution ( Exs~ 2 and 3) in their present form could
not have been signed and executed on December 23, 1959.
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Any reference to the P.I.E. Terminal job was impossible at that
time, since the job did not exist. (R. 264, 265, 272) (Ex. 20)
Max Andrews and Ned Shurtleff both testified that they
signed both of the instruments on December 23, 1959. (R. 226228, 255, 256). This evidence was corroborated by Mr. Lester,
who actually typed in some of the typing on the documents,
(R. 249, 250) and also to some extent by Mr. Eldredge, who testified that Mr. Henich came to the office December 23, 1959.
(R. 261, 262).
On the date which appellants' evidence shows the documents were signed, to-wit, December 23, 1959, the corporate
resolution (Ex. 3) stated only that it covered the St. Joseph
Convent job. The words, construction of P.l.E. Truck Terminal,
$271,030.00 were not on the document. The front page of
Exhibit 2 was, so far as the parties could recollect, in blank.
The agreement was only signed in connection with and to
indemnify the St. Joseph Convent job. (R. 244).
Defendant's evidence logically corroborates the dates on
Exhibit 2, the notarization thereof, the date of the Special
Stockholders' Meeting on Exhibit 3, and the date of certification
thereof. It should be kept in mind that these two documents
\Yere executed and notarized in the manner which is most
solemn and most reliable in establishing truthfulnesss of the
facts of the agreement. Our statute makes the acknowledgment
prima facie evidence of the date of execution. Tarpey v. Deseret
Salt Company, 14 Pac. 338 (Utah).
The plaintiff, in suing on this agreement either had to sue
on the December 23, 1959 date, which would then admit the
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written alteration of the instrument; or, had to sue claiming
execution of the document subsequent to January 25, claiming
the oral alteration and modification of the agreement. In either
event, the agreement is materially and substantially altered,
destroying its validity.
Without conceding that the written agreement can be
altered by parol evidence, let us examine that actual date which
the Court has determined to exist as an execution date in lieu
of December 23, 1959.
B. LACK OF A DEFINITE DATE FOR THE INSTRUMENTS.
Having disregarded the exact terms and dates of the written
contract, acknowledgments and corporate resolutions, the plaintiff must establish a new date for these documents at least as
definite as was the old date. It is axiomatic under contract law
that a contract document must be definite in its composition,
otherwise it lacks an important contract element.
Significantly, the plaintiff did not establish any definite
date of execution under his parol evidence. Repeatedly, all of
the plaintiff's witnesses were indefinite in their evasive answers,
testifying without contradiction that all of the events transpired
sometime during the week of January 2 5 through January 30.
A brief sun1mary of the applicable testimony of these witnesses
is as follows:
MR. SCHALOW:
As the only witness on plaintiff's case in chief, stated
that on the basis of statements made to him in the
forn1 of hearsay evidence, he concluded that the agree-
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ment \vas typed sotnetime between January 25 and
January 30, 1960. (R. 1·15, 146, 153).
MR. BARTON:
When asked when Henich brought the P.I.E. contract
into his office, Barton stated, Ctit was during the last
week of January through January 30th. During that
period of time." (R. 179).
In testifying about the receipt of a financial statement
on Shurtleff & Andrews, he stated, c CWe received these
statements the latter part of the week of January 2 5
through January 30." (R. 182).
He again stated: Ctl had taken a verbal report from
Dun & Bradstreet, as I indicated, during the week
from January 25 through January 3t0h." (R. 184).
In answer to a question concerning his knowledge
as to when Exhibit 2 was prepared, he stated: celt was
prepared in the latter part of the week of January 25
to January 30." (R. 196).
In testifying concerning the execution of the corporate resolutions (Ex. 3), he stated: CtThat was the
latter part of the week of January 25 through January
30."
Again, in testifying about the receipt of Exhibit 15,
he said he received it Ctduring the week of January
25 through January 30th." (R. 202).
He further stated that he had in his possession Exhibits 14 and 15 prior to the preparation of Exhibits
2 and 3. ( R. 20 3) .
In answer to this question by Mr. Bayle, CCOther
than being able to say that the typing was done sometime during the week of January 25 to January 30, you
don't know the day upon which the typing was done,
do you?" He answered: "Not the exact date." (R. 208).
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Again, he stated that he did not know when any
documents were dated or received. (R. 211).
MRS. FARLEY:
In answer to the question as to when pages l and 3
were typed, she stated: ((It would have been during
the week from January 25th to 30th, 1960." (R. 284).
She further stated that the documents were brought
back and notarized during the same week. (R. 287).
At Page 290 of the record appear the following
questions and answers:

((Q. You testified that these documents were prepared
during the week of January 25th through January
30th?
UA. Yes.

((Q. You cannot be more explicit than that as to what
date these were prepared on, can you?
((A. I'm sorry, I cannot.

ceQ. Is it possible they were prepared on Saturday?
((A. I cannot be more specific than that, it was during
that week.''
At page 291 of the record, appear the following questions
and answers:

ceQ. You don't recall the date the documents were
returned to you by Mr. Henich, do you?
HA. No, I do not.

((Q. Was that also during this

wee~k

of from January

25th to January 30th?

CCA. To the best of my knowledge.

nQ. It was?
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"A. It was during this week.

"Q. Everything happened during this week?
"A. It appears so."
In answer to the question as to when the P.I.E. bond was
prepared, she stated:
·"fhat would have been prepared during this same
,
wee.
k
MR. DALE FOOTE:
Mr. Foote was unable to fix any date that the documents were prepared or signed, but stated that the
P.I.E. contract (Ex. 17) was brought into the office on
the same day that Exhibits 2 and 3 were prepared.

(R. 306).
A closer examination of the alleged sequence of events
found in the testimony of the plaintiffs, and compared to the
uncontroverted facts, indicates that the events as testified to
could not have happened in the manner claimed by the plaintiff.
Mr. Barton testified that the first contact he had with Mr.
Henich \vas the day Henich brought in the P.I.E. contract,
which was during Monday or Tuesday, January 25 or 26. At
this time, Barton told Henich that Henich could not have
a bond. (R. 178, 179). Two days later, Henich came back,
at which time Mr. Barton claims that Henich asked if Shurtleff
& Andrews could be indemnitors on the bond. At this time,
Mr. Barton indicated that they could not be indemnitors
because the financial statement which he had on the corporation
(Shurtleff & Andrews, Inc.) (Ex. 14) was insufficient. (R.
181). Exhibit 14 had been delivered October 12, 1959, and
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covered only the Shurtleff & Andrews, Inc. corporation up to
the end of July of 1959. (R. 309).
Apparently thereafter, Mr. Henich and Mr. Barton obtained
the financial statement of Shurtleff & Andrews Construction
Company, the partnership, and made various calls relating to
the financial stability of the partnership. There is no testimony
from Mr. Barton as to how long thereafter it was before the
alleged Exhi~its 2 and 3 were prepared and delivered to Mr.
Henich. He states, however, that they were returned February 1,
1961, at which time they were notarized. (R. 328).
Mrs. Farley, however, in complete contradiction to Mr.
Barton, states that the documents were prepared sometime
between January 25th and January 30th, and ((were returned
to her no later than January 30, 1961." (R. 287-291). In further
contradiction to both Mr. Barton and Mrs. Farley, Dale Foote
testified that Exhibit 17, the P .I.E. contract, was brought in on
the same day that Exhibits 2 and 3 were prepared. All of this
oral testimony indicates conclusively that there is no definite
date upon which we can rely as the date of the contract.
Under plaintiff's evidence, the Dun & Bradstreet report
(Ex. 16) was not received by Dale Barton until February 11.
This coincidentaily is the same date that Mr. Schalow stated
was the issuance date for the P .I.E. bond. (R. 158).
Mr. Foote gave Doris Farley the information on the officers
of Shurtleff & Andrews. He allegedly gave this to her based
upon information from the financial reports received from the
accounting firm. (R. 301, 305). These reports, however, do not
give the names of any officers. (Exs. 14 and 15). He stated
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that he did see Exhibit 16, the Dun & Bradstreet report, in
~lr. Henich's financial file. (R. 302). This is the only report
from which he could have obtained the erroneous designation
that Mirian Andrews was secretary of the corporation, since
this name appears in the upper-left-hand corner of Exhibit 16.
Therefore, Mr. Foote could not have given this information
to Doris Farley until after February 11, when the report supposedly was received; unless he gave it to her beforehand in
October, the date which the Dun & Bradstreet report bears.
This latter supposition is entirely consistent with the date of
the corporation financial report (Ex. 14) and with the use of
these two reports in connection with the execution of the
St. Joseph Convent bond. Another instance of the confusing
evidence adduced by plaintiff in support of the alleged execution
date of Exhibits 2 and 3.
The following uncontradicted facts show the impossibility
of the events happening as testified to above. Mr. Liffereth,
a representative of the P.I.E. Company, was mailed the P.I.E.
contracts under date of January 27, 1961, from Oakland, California. (Ex. 18). He testified that he did not receive these
documents until January 28th, and that Mr. Henich could not
have possibly obtained them from him until at least the 28th.
(R. 218, 219, 267). Therefore, assuming, in accordance with
Mr. Barton's testimony, that Mr. Henich immediately brought
the contract to Mr. Barton, this would not have been until
Thursday, January 28th, at the very earliest. Mr. Barton testified that Mr. Henich did not come back until two days later,
which would have put the time at Saturday, January 30th.
Thereafter, according to Mr. Barton's testimony, investigation
was made concerning the financial status of the defendants
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Shurtleff & Andrews Construction Company as a partnership,
and calls were made to Dun & Bradstreet to satisfy Mr. Barton
concerning the credit rating.
Therefore, if prepared in January at all, Exhibits 2 and 3
would have had to have been prepared apparently Saturday
or Sunday, the 30th and 31st. The Court can, of course, take
judicial notice of the fact that these are not regular business
days, and that consummation of these transactions on Saturday
and Sunday, or thereafter, are to say the least, unreasonable.
In any event, the testimony of Mr. Barton and Mrs. Farley
is completely discredited because of their own confused concept
of the claim of the plaintiff and of the sequence of events.
Mr. Henich testified that after delivering a copy of the
contract to Mr. Barton, he went to San Francisco and did not
return until February 1, or after. (R. 267). There was no
evidence to contradict this testimony, and the absence of
Mr. Henich over the weekend would further preclude the
preparation and signature of Exhibits 2 and 3 at that time.
Furthermore, Ned Shurtleff testified, supporting his testimony with corporation memorandums and actual receipts, that
on January 25, he was in Ely, Nevada; January 26, he was
in Gabbs, Nevada; on January 27, he was in Gabbs, Nevada;
and, on January 28th and 29th, he was on his way home,
driving from Gabbs, Nevada. (Ex. 19).
Appellants submit that the foregoing evidence conclusively
precludes the Court from finding that the agreement was executed sometime between January 25 and January 30. Mr. Barton
himself testified that it could not have been executed until
February 1 or after. Even if the Court was warranted in making
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such a finding, this finding is insufficient as a matter of law
to support the execution date of the contract. There is no
evidence whatsoever to indicate whether or not the Indemnity
Agreement, if executed at all during that period, was executed
before or after the execution of the bonds for the P .I.E. project.
C. THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENT WAS EXECUTED
DECEMBER 23, 1959.
In contrast to the confusing and inconclusive facts used by
the Court as a basis for its finding, we have the reasonable,
definite and specific evidence to support the finding that the
defendants signed the Indemnity Agreement December 23,
1959 to indemnify the plaintiff on the St. Joseph Convent job.
The facts presented by the defendants are consistent with common sense and are unclouded by the deliberate falsification
and backdating upon which the plaintiff must rely.
First and foremost are the documents themselves. They are
presumed at law to have been dated and executed December
23, 1959. (Exs. 2 and 3). This date is consistent with the date
of the execution of the St. Joseph Convent bond, which bond
\\'as issued in late December or early January, according to
Mr. Barton. (R. 176-178, 323) (Ex. 13).
Mr. Barton admitted, when called as an adverse witness,
that Doris Farley notarized the document after it was signed.
At Page 189 of the record are the following questions and
answers:

"Q. Is it true that she notarized that document after
the signatures were affixed to it, isn't it?
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"A. Yes, sir.

"Q. How do you know that?
''A. Well, you can tell-

"Q. By the date?
"A. Yes. It was brought in and then it was notarized.

"Q. You can tell by the date of the notarization, isn't
that true?

CCA. Yes, sir.
"Q. And what date is that?
teA. That date is December 23, 1959, is it not?"
Max Andrews was able to fix the signing of Exhibits 2
and 3 as occurring on December 23 because of his recollection
of the Christmas open house held at his office that day. He
further recalled having just returned from a trip to Idaho,
bringing back Christmas hams for his employees and friends.
(R. 226-230). He definitely did not see the documents after
the 23rd.
At the time Mr. Andrews signed, Exhibit 2 had no typing
on the first page. There was nothing on the corporate resolution
relating to the P.I.E. Truck Terminal contract. (R. 236-238).
At the time he and Mr. Shurtleff signed the Indemnity Agreement, it was for the purpose of indemnifying the St. Joseph
Convent job only. (R. 237-238). Mr. Henich also so testified
in answer to Mr. Bayle's questions on cross-examination. (R.
275). Henich had also told and agreed with Mr. Barton that
this Indemnity Agreement was to apply only to the Convent
job. (R. 276).
No one ever informed the defendants that this Indemnity
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1\greement had ever been accepted and they heard nothing more
about it until July of 1960. (R. 190, 206).
Mr. Lester, the office manager for Shurtleff & Andrews,
had a distinct recollection that these exhibits were executed
December 23, 1959. He recalled typing the name of Ned
E. Shurtleff in lieu of the name of "Mirian Andrews, which
appeared on both Exhibits 2 and 3. (R. 249, 250).
The execution and furnishing of the financial statements
from Wood, Child, Mann & Smith are not inconsistent with
the defendants' testimony. The plaintiff's own witness, Mrs.
Pugsley, stated that the financial statement for the corporation
(Ex. 14) covered a period up to July 31, 1959, and was
delivered out of her office October 12, 1959, long before either
of the two contracts were let. (R. 308, 312). The other financial
statement was delivered out of her office January 28, and she
assumed it was delivered to the client. The financial statement
of October 12 was used for the Convent job (R. 248), and
Mr. Andrews assumed that the latter financial statement was
also used in connection with that job.
There seems little doubt that Henich obtained a bond on
the P.I.E. job sometime in February-presumably on February 1.
Likewise, there appears to be little doubt that financial statements of the defendants were obtained sometime, and together
\vith a Dun & Bradstreet report (Ex. 16) were considered and
filed \vith the plaintiff in connection with the P.I.E. bond. These
facts are not at all inconsistent with the defendant's concept
of the facts pointing to the execution of Exhibits 2 and 3 on
December 23, 1959. It could be reasonably argued that the
plaintiff would have wanted further financial information con-
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cerning the indemnitors before issuing another bond. However,
it is uncontroverted that after the defendants had signed the Indemnity Agreement, it only applied to the Convent job, and that
no further contact was ever had between them and the plaintiff.
It likewise appears evident from the evidence that the plaintiff
merely added the P.I.E. job under the coverage of the already
existing Indemnity Agreement.
POINT IV.
PLAINTIFF'S ADMISSIONS PRECLUDE THE TRIAL
COURT FROM FINDING IN PLAINTIFF'S FAVOR.
The plaintiff apparently did not develop the theory of
relying upon a parol January date in contradiction to the express
December date until after the Complaint was filed. The Complaint, in Paragraph 4, alleges in essence (R. 2) that the
defendants and the plaintiff, on or about December 23, 1959,
entered into the Indemnity Agreement to indemnify the plaintiff
for any losses which the plaintiff rrmight incur or sustain by
reason of it becoming a surety" on the St. Joseph job. (Italics
added). In Paragraph 5 of the Complaint, the plaintiff
states that in reliance upon the execution of the said Indemnity
Agreement, and as an inducement for so doing, the plaintiff
executed and delivered a Performance and Payment Bond for
the Convent job. (R. 3). It could not be stated more clearly
that the Indemnity Agreement was executed before the bond
was executed, and that the bond was executed in reliance upon
the Indemnity Agreement.
Mr. Schalow, at the trial, had read to him this portion
of the Complaint, and left no doubt at all but what he agreed
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with the language of the Complaint. (R. 154, 155). Mr. Barton
conclusively confirmed the fact that the Convent bond was
executed and delivered in the latter part of December, or the
early part of January, long before the P.I.E. job and P.I.E.
bond were executed. (R. 175, 176).
There can be no doubt that the plaintiff by judicial admission in the pleadings and by admission in its testimony confirmed the fact that the Indemnity Agreement (designated as
Exhibit "A" attached to the Complaint, and as Exhibit 2 in the
trial) was executed and delivered prior to January 25, and was
in fact executed in connection with and prior to the execution,
delivery and issuance of the Convent bond. Such judicial admissions are conclusively binding upon the party making them,
and preclude the trial court from making a finding inconsistent
therewith. The plaintiff is estopped from claiming in contradiction to said admissions. The Court, in finding facts contrary
thereto, has sustained a material deviation in the plaintiff's
proof from the allegations set forth in the pleadings. The fact
that the plaintiff's witnesses at the trial confirmed this allegation in the Complaint, gives it further conclusiveness as a
judicial admission against the interest of the plaintiff.

SUMMARY
Were this an equity case, the defendants and appellants
might reasonably invoke the ccclean hands" doctrine. In other
words, can the plaintiff come into court, suing upon a written
contract, then offer it in evidence, attempt to show that the
plaintiff deliberately and intentionally falsified the date thereon,
that the plaintiffs Notary Public had deliberately falsified her
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notarization, that the plaintiff had intentionally and deliberately
backdated the documents in order to give them meaning beyond
the written terms thereof, and had thus wilfully rendered the
documents false-all of this in order to then establish an
indefinite date by parol evidence, thereby imposing additional
liability of $271,030.00 on the indemnitors? We think not.
Should this loose practice be permitted in the surety business, where the plaintiff is handling and is writing hundreds
of thousands of such agreements, where the liability amounts
are large, in which business the defendants are complete
strangers, where the documents are not prepared in duplicate
and the original is kept within the complete control of the
surety, and where there is no notification to the indemnitors of
acceptance, review or other use whatsoever of the agreement?
(R. 206).
The statement, Hsometime during the week of January 25
through January 30" was the plaintiff's magic cure-all. In answer
to every question regarding the happening of any event, plaintiff
and all of its witnesses gave this very handy answer. Why?
Simply because the Indemnity Agreement under the plaintiff's
theory had to be signed after the P .I.E. contract date (to fix the
amount of $271,030.00), January 25, and before the P.I.E. bond
was allegedly executed on February 1 (to show reliance thereon). (R. 183). The whole series of events, Mr. Barton stated,
took a week, beginning on Monday or Tuesday thereof. However, the actual facts show that the P .I.E. contract did not arrive
in Salt Lake until Thursday, the 28th; that Mr. Henich, assuming he delivered it immediately to Mr. Barton, did not again
come back to Mr. Barton until Saturday, two days later. After
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his second visit, all of the events apparently transpired, which
Mr. Barton and all of the other witnesses testified were happening during the week. If this had been the case, and since the
court \vill judicially notice the fact that most businesses are
closed Saturdays and Sundays, all of these events crammed into
one day should have made quite an impression upon everyone
concerned. There shouldn't have been much doubt in the plaintiff's witnesses' minds as to when the alleged signing and preparation of the documents occurred. However, there evidently
was no such impression created, understandably so because
Exhibits 2 and 3 had been signed earlier, notarized earlier, and
relied upon earlier, as Mr. Barton and Mr. Schalow admitted
in confirming the allegations of the Complaint and the notarization of the document. (R. 154, 189). Henich apparently
merely obtained the new P.I.E. bond on or after February 1,
1960, without further signing of Exhibits 2 and 3.
Defendants and appellants have objected throughout the
proceedings to varying the date of execution of the Indemnity
Agreement. This is found first in the Motion to Dismiss
(R. 16), throughout the trial, (R. 51, 69, 110, 111, 164-166,
195, 283, 302, 347-362) and, finally in the Motion for New
Trial. (R. 88). The trial Court has consistently committed
prejudicial error in admitting the evidence varying the agreement date, in finally finding that the Indemnity Agreement
covered the P.I.E. job, and was executed during the week of
January 25-30. The Judgment should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
ELLIOTT LEE PRATT
CLYDE & MECHAM
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